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Frederick C. Luebke

The German Ethnic Group in Brazil:
The Ordeal of World WarP

In April, 1917, shortly after Brazil broke off diplomatic relations with
Germany, Brazilians of German origin or descent were victims of
numerous, destructive riots. Although death and personal injury were
minimal, property damage was enormous as hundreds of residences,
business houses, factories, and warehouses were damaged or destroyed
by mobs gone out of control. Porto Alegre was the scene of the worst
riots, but disturbances occurred almost simultaneously in Sao Paulo,
Pelotas, and other cities of the South, where large numbers of German
Brazilians lived. Six months later, following Brazil's declaration of war
against the German Empire, another series of riots resulted in more
destruction in the German districts of Rio de Janeiro, Petr6polis,
Curitiba, and elsewhere. 2
Like most riots, these outbursts of violence may be attributed to
immediate causes. In this case, intergroup tension was intensified by
genuine dismay and anger over Germany's having torpedoed Brazilian
merchant vessels, by virulent anti-German propaganda, and by the
rhetorical excesses of pro-Ally politicians. But that is like saying that
World War I itself was caused in 1914 by the Serbian nationalist who
assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. The antiGerman riots in Brazil are better understood within a larger context of
ethnic history: The behavior of the dominant Luso-Brazilians (persons of
Portuguese language and culture) and the minority Teuto-Brazilians (as
the Germans were often called) may be best interpreted if examined
historically in terms of ethnic group relations, perceptions, and images. 3
Germans were among the earliest and most numerous of nonPortuguese Europeans to settle in Brazil. Beginning in the 1820s, a small
stream of Germans entered the country, largely as a consequence of
vigorous recruitment efforts sponsored by the Brazilian government.
The number of German immigrants seldom exceeded two thousand in a
single year. Yet after nearly a century they had multiplied and pros-
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pered until they numbered approximately 400,000 persons, mostly
Brazilian-born and German-speaking. 4
Although colonies of German immigrants developed in several of the
large citjes and seaports in Brazil, the majority sought new homes in
rural regions that had been ignored or bypassed by earlier Portuguese or
Azorean settlers. Locating chiefly in the southern states of Rio Grande
do SuI and Santa Catarina and to a lesser extent in Parana, they built a
new society, different from what they had known in Germany and
different as well from that of the receiving Luso-Brazilian society. The
Teuto-Brazilians adapted their agricultural practices to subtropical realities, raised large families, and built churches, schools, and towns. They
were the dominant group in some provincial cities, notably Sao Leopoldo, Blumenau, and Joinville, and became an influential minority in
such major cities as Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. s
Because of the accidents of time and place, the Germans in Brazil had
been allowed to develop their own society without much interference.
By the 1880s, the last years of the Brazilian Empire, they had become a
society within a society-a large, diverse, and structured community
with its own values, attitudes, language, and folkways. In general, they
were well received, respected, and valued for the contributions they
were making to Brazilian economy and culture. 6
With the advent ofthe republic in 1889, however, attitudes toward
the Teuto-Brazilians began to change. The difference was partly a matter
of confidence: The republic had to demonstrate its authority and its
ability to govern, a task made more difficult by the diffusion of political
power among the states and the development of political parties on a
state basis. The abolition of slavery had its own repercussions as many
thousands of new immigrants were recruited in Italy, Spain, and
Portugal to supplement the labor supply. At the same time, the
modernization of the economic structure of Brazil was under way,
especially in the South. With the expansion of industry in relation to the
production of agricultural commodities came economic and social dislocations that were new to Brazilian experience. As the world has
witnessed so often in the twentieth century, modernization produced
new social problems and tensions, especially in the cities. Some Brazilians, doubting the capacity of their society to absorb the flood of
immigrants, demanded that the newcomers learn to conform to Brazilian ways.7
A measure of nativism also invaded Brazilian thought and attitude.
Nativism was consonant with the doctrines of the Comtean positivism
to which many of the new republican leaders subscribed. The commitment of the Brazilian positivists was not merely to progress, but also to
order, which they understood to include a harmony among the classes,
races, ethnic groups, and sexes. They could applaud the diverse origins
of Brazilian society and culture and yet insist that a new unity-a
distinctively Brazilian unity-had to be achieved, by force of dictatorship, if necessary.s
During the decade before the outbreak of World War I, many
Brazilians in all levels of society, but especially among the ruling classes,
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began to perceive the Germans as a problem-an element that threatened the equilibrium of Brazilian society. 9 The Germans seemed rich
and powerful, socially exclusive, and unwilling to be assimilated. To the
more suspicious, they were eager accomplices in a vast Pan-Germanic
plot to extend the power of the German Empire and with it German
language and culture to all parts of the world, especially the southern
states of Brazi1. 10
The Brazilian image of the Germans, like most stereotypes, rested on
insufficient and distorted information, rhetorical exaggeration, and
myths. l l There was little comprehension of the diversity within the
group, such as the differences that divided Catholics from Protestants or
the disparate values and behaviors that separated rural farmers from
urban workers and businessmen, or Teuto-Brazilians from Reichsdeutsche. Perceptions were drawn primarily from the behavior of the
ethnic elite-the articulate, educated clergy, journalists, and businessmen who perpetuated immigrant culture because it served their economic interests and satisfied their psychological needs.
To the most ethnocentric among the German elite it seemed obvious
that Luso-Brazilian culture was inferior to their own. They found little in
it that they deemed worthy of adaptation or imitation. Brazilian culture
was thought to be weak, and Luso-Brazilians themselves seemed to
combine indolence with ridiculous conceit. As for their Portuguese
language, it seemed useful to know but unimportant in terms of world
culture. Compared to German, they thought, it offered few literary
treasures. 12
At the same time, however, these same Teuto-Brazilians sought
acceptance and recognition. They were eager to be considered an
essential element in their adopted country's history and they wanted
Brazilians to understand and appreciate how extensive their contributions had been to Brazil's development. Thus, the literature of TeutoBrazilian filiopietism describes how individual Germans had participated in the exploration of the land, the independence movement, and
the preservation of Brazilian territorial integrity through the wars with
Argentina and Paraguay. Moreover, they insisted that German leaders
had helped to initiate the renewal of national intellectual life through
their defense of liberty of conscience. Filiopietists also stressed the role
of the Germans in placing new value and dignity on work and in
condemning slavery as morally and socially obnoxious; they had contributed significantly to the elevation of moral, cultural, and material
standards in Brazil; and they could take credit, at least in part, for the
emergence of the middle class in Brazil. 13
For a substantial proportion of the German sub society in Brazil, this
kind of ethnocentric talk was pointless. Like any other immigrant group,
the German included persons who were favorably disposed toward the
language and culture of the host society and wanted to become a part of
it as quickly and painlessly as possible.1 4 Unlike the cultural idealists
who insisted that it was their right to maintain their immigrant speech
and folkways and who denied the right of the government to demand
that they learn the language of the country, such rapid assimilators were
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eager to abandon the marks of immigrant status because they had
become a source of social and economic deprivation.
Between these two-the cultural chauvinists at one extreme and the
rapid assimilators at the other-was the majority, who saw no problem
at all. They went about their daily business gradually adapting to their
surroundings and rarely giving the problem of assimilation any thought.
If their assimilation was unusually slow, it was because they had further
to go, culturally speaking, than, for example, the Italians, to whom they
were frequently and negatively compared. Because of this cultural
distance, they tended to cluster in separate communities. Since they
were so numerous, they could create the institutions that maintained
their distinctive cultural forms. Yet through daily contacts at work, in
s~hool, at church, or at the store, they learned Portuguese more or less
automatically. Whether they learned quickly or slowly depended upon
individual circumstances and whether it provided good or poor opportunities for interaction with speakers of Portuguese. For most of them,
however, the ability to speak Portuguese became the symbol of higher
social status; it was the avenue to social and economic progress,
especially for the young. IS
When governmental personnel began to object to the exclusiveness
of the rural German colonies and the slowness of the Germans to
assimilate, as they did in the two decades preceding World War I, they
thought first of the extreme cases-the highly isolated districts where
there were no Portuguese-language schools and where hundreds of
second- and third-generation children could be found whose knowledge
of Portuguese was rudimentary at best. Similarly, when they tried to
identify typical German attitudes, they naturally paid attention to the
most conspicuous persons-the noisy idealists who made speeches and
wrote editorials, ,essays, and letters demandirtg the right to maintain
their cultural separatism.
Thus the Luso-Brazilian majority acquired a distorted image of the
Teuto-Brazilians. Some elements of the composite picture were correct,
others were out of proportion, and a few were simply wrong. For
decades in the nineteenth century, the Luso-Brazilian majority had
ignored the question of German assimilation, probably because it had
not seemed important enough to demand action. Then, when the failure
of the Germans to assimilate began to be perceived as a problem, some
Brazilian leaders tended to overreact and to press for extreme or farreaching measures that were intended to enforce greater conformity.
When national rivalries exploded into world war in 1914, LusoBrazilian sympathies were strongly with France and her allies and their
tolerance for the loyalty Teuto-Brazilians naturally felt for Germany was
correspondingly reduced. Influential political and cultural leaders then
attacked Brazil's German ethnic group as a menace to national security
and recklessly charged them with a full range of subversive activity. The
subsequent anti-German riots of 1917 were thUs the natural children
born of intergroup tensions in conjunction with the accidents of world
history.
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The long neutrality period from 1914 to 1917 was generally a period
of incubation for these tensions. Circumstances in Brazil were much like
those in the United States. Germans in both countries felt a strong bond
of loyalty to the land of their fathers; the host societies leaned toward
the Allies. In Brazil, the Portuguese-language press quickly became a
vehicle for intensely anti-German atrocity propaganda; the Germans in
Brazil vigorously countered with propagandistic efforts of their own.
The effect of this verbal conflict was to rejuvenate the German ethnic
community and invest it with a new sense of self-esteem, if not strength.
The German-language press thrived and voluntary organization experienced new surges of vitality as they shared in the new chauvinism. 16
German ethnic behavior was not, of course, uniform. This was
especially true of the churches. The leading Protestant denomination
was the Evangelical Church, which was organized in several synods.
Especially strong in Rio Grande do Sul, it claimed as members about half
of all Teuto-Brazilians. In the nineteenth century the Evangelicals (plus
certain Lutheran groups) developed strong institutional ties with the
Prussian state church, from which they received most of their clergy in
addition to significant financial support. Not surprisingly, it became a
central doctrine among Evangelicals that German language and culture
were inseparable from religious belief. In the neutrality period, therefore, Evangelical parishes and other institutions became powerful
agents for the promotion of pro-Germanism. They raised funds for the
German Red Cross, bought German war bonds, sponsored bazaars and
rallies to aid German victims of war; special prayer services were held to
implore the deity for the success of German armsY
In contrast to the Evangelicals, the Lutherans, especially those
affiliated with the North American Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod,
were much less chauvinistic. Their subsidies came not from Germany
but from the United States. Even though this church still used German
as its basic language, it believed that a transition to Portuguese was
essential to survival. Hence, it never offered a word of defense for
Germany or for the preservation of Deutschtum. These Lutherans saw
the European conflict as a judgment of God upon a sinful peoplepunishment for wickedness, unbelief, failure to pray, contempt for
God's word, and the idolatry of human wisdom as revealed especially in
modern science and theological liberalism. 18
The German Catholics in Brazil provided a third pattern of behavior.
That Catholicism was the religion of the vast majority of Brazilians made
their situation fundamentally different from the Protestants. The German Catholics were nearly as numerous as the Evangelicals but were
much less chauvinistic. Because the Catholic church was universal and
multiethnic, it tended to unite its German adherents with other Brazilians-persons of Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish origins-rather
than to separate or isolate them from the rest of society. Even when a
Catholic parish consisted largely of Teuto-Brazilians, it usually was not a
ready agency for raising either money or enthusiasm for Germany's
cause. Moreover, the preeminent German in the Brazilian Catholic
hierarchy, Archbishop Joao Becker of Porto Alegre, was determined to
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align his administration with the dominant attitudes and behaviors of
Luso-Brazilian society. Nevertheless, there were individual German
Catholics who were outspoken in their partisanship for Germany. 19
In contrast to the churches, secular ethnic societies, especially the
umbrella organizations, were more likely to lend themselves consistently to active or vocal pro-Germanism. Brazil had no national organization like the National German-American Alliance in the United States,
but early in 1916 a German agent, ostensibly working as a fund-raiser for
the German Red Cross, founded the short-lived Germanischer Bund fUr
Siid-Amerika. Widely publicized, this organization inevitably generated
suspicion and alarm among partisans of the Allies; but even within the
German subsociety it also earned much opposition because it represented a challenge to the established ethnic leadership, especially the
Evangelical clergy.20
The Germanischer Bund unintentionally stimulated the growth of
patriotic organizations among Luso-Brazilians, the most important of
which was the Liga pelos alliados (League for the Allies). Led by the
brilliant Brazilian orator and statesman, Ruy Barbosa, this organization
bore a striking resemblance to the National Security League in the
United States. Both organizations defended the Allies, advocated preparedness, protested alleged German atrocities, raised funds for the
British and French Red Cross, and sought to hasten the assimilation of
immigrants through educational means-literacy programs, instruction
in the language of the host society, and in the promotion of patriotism.
A special target of the Liga pelos alliados was Brazil's distinguished
foreign minister, Lauro Miiller, a thoroughly assimilated second-generation Teuto-Brazilian who was finally forced out of office in May, 1917. 21
Following Germany's decision to resume unrestricted submarine
warfare on February 1, 1917, anti-German propaganda was intensified
in Brazil. It was repeatedly charged that Germany was plotting to use
the Teuto-Brazilian colonies in the southern states as the base for its
imperialist designs. Similarly, the German-language newspapers persisted in their intense pro-Germanism, despite many ominous signs that
Luso-Brazilian tolerance for such behavior was weakening. 22
The breaking point came on April 5, 1917, when a German submarine torpedoed a small Brazilian freighter, the Parana, off the coast of
France. Official confirmation of the sinking came on the same day the
United States declared war on Germany.23 Brazilian newspapers stormily protested the loss and demanded that the government take decisive
action; the Liga pelos alliados urged an immediate declaration of war and
several prominent dailies swelled the chorus. 24 Patriotic rallies and
demonstrations attracted huge crowds in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo,
Porto Alegre, and elsewhere. In several cities these demonstrations
were transformed into ugly anti-German affairs. Allegedly impelled by
patriotism, crowds of people surged to prominent German business
establishments, clubhouses of German societies, and German-language
newspapers. Despite genuine efforts of municipal governments to
maintain order, several demonstrations degenerated into riots causing
enormous losses due to arson and 100ting. 25
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On Saturday, April 14, and continuing through to Tuesday, April 17,
Porto Alegre experienced the worst of these riots, as much of its German
district was burned. Mobs consisting largely of waterfront riffraff,
enlivened by alcoholic drink, pillaged the district. At the end of three
days of riot, nearly three hundred buildings lay in various stages of ruin.
Factories, warehouses, restaurants, schools, newspaper offices, plus
many private residences were damaged or destroyed. 26
Riots plagued other cities in Rio Grande do SuI, most notably
Pelotas, located near the southern tip of Brazil. Although the heavily
German state of Santa Catarina was mostly spared, other cities from
Curitiba in Parana to Pernambuco far to the north experienced disturbances. Governments on all levels attempted to cope with the problem
of civil disorder as efficiently as possible, yet in the weeks that followed,
superpatriots continued their intolerant and inflammatory rhetoric. The
press also continued to print, as it had before the riots, the wildest of
rumors, including one that an army of 80,000 armed Germans were
gathering in Santa Catarina, where the governor was Felippe Schmidt,
another Brazilian-born German, a cousin of Lauro Miiller, the foreign
minister. 27
The range of reaction among the Germans of Brazil following the
April riots was as varied as the people themselves. A few fled to the
exclusive German colonies in the interior, but most were willing to
accommodate their behavior to the newly narrowed standards of
patriotic conduct. Some decided that the best course would be to make
overt gestures of assimilation. This could be done most obviously by
changing German names to something acceptable in Portuguese. Others
dropped their memberships in the numerous Vereine or withdrew their
children from the German schools. The German-language newspapers
suspended publication for a couple of weeks, but by the end of April
most had resumed publication, with government approval. A sharp
division of opinion emerged regarding the proper course to follow.
Some die-hard chauvinists were more determined than ever to maintain
their ethnicity and to assert the justice of the German cause, but others
advised a more moderate course. 28 Even though the majority of the
ordinary German-speaking Brazilians had been indifferent to the war in
Europe, many persons had now been touched by it in a frightfully direct
way. Given the unrestrained character of the riots and the hatred they
seemed to project, many Teuto-Brazilians wondered what would happen to them if Brazil actually declared war.
That did not occur until another six months had passed. On October
25, 1917, following the news that another Brazilian vessel, the Macao,
had been torpedoed, the Brazilian president asked Congress to declare
war, which it promptly did the following day. Nearly as promptly,
Brazil subjected itself to another round of riots. This time Rio Grande do
SuI remained relatively free of trouble, although this was not true of the
city of Pelotas. Santa Catarina suffered serious disorders in Itajai and
Florianopolis. But the worst excesses occurred in the cities farther north,
beginning on October 28 in Curitiba, spreading to Petro polis, and
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climaxing in Rio de Janeiro on November 3. As in April, property
damage was extensive but there was no loss of life. 29
Government repression of its German ethnic citizens began immediately after the declaration of war. The minister of the interior ordered an
end to all publications in the German language, including newspapers,
periodicals, and books, even prayer books and textbooks for teaching
German speakers to learn Portuguese. Another decree ordered the
closing of all German schools in which Portuguese was not the language
of instruction. The Brazilian postal service announced that it would no
longer handle materials printed in the German language. There were
also injunctions against the use of German-language in public meetings,
including worship services in the immigrant churches. 30
Congress also enacted special wartime legislation, the most significant of which was the Lei de guerra, enacted on November 16, 1917. This
law chiefly treated economic problems and was aimed directly at the
great German-owned banks and coffee-exporting firms. By it the president of the republic was empowered to seize the property of enemy
aliens and to sell all goods consigned to them. Superpatriots in the
Congress also demanded and received a provision granting the president the authority to declare any part of the country to be under a state
of siege. The next day the president announced that Rio de Janeiro and
the southern states were in such a state of siege. Martial law was
imposed, seven hundred German aliens were interned, and detachments of the Brazilian army were billeted in the German colonies.
Inevitably, German aliens were required to register with police; passes
with fingerprints and photographs were issued; and mail was censored. 31
The total prohibition against any publication in the German language
was far severer than any wartime restrictions imposed by the United
States upon its German-speaking minority. In Brazil economic survival
for the publishers was possible only if they switched entirely to
Portuguese, which many of them did. Such Portuguese-language substitutes almost always were considered to be temporary expedients but
inevitably most newspapers experienced sharp reductions in the number of their subscribers.
Like the newspapers, the German-language schools were shut down
immediately-267 in Santa Catarina alone. They were not allowed to
open until they could demonstrate that they were staffed with teachers
competent in Portuguese and that instructional materials in Portuguese
were going to be used. 32 In the United States there was nothing
comparable to Brazil's nationwide closure of private and parochial
German-language schools, although German-language instruction was
generally curtailed in the public schools. Even though enforcement was
lax in some districts, many schools never reopened. Because public
schools had never been established in many areas of German settlement, the regulation meant that thousands of Teuto-Brazilian children
were simply deprived of education during the war.
It was also a difficult time for many of the German churches,
especially in the larger towns and cities, where superpatriotic pressures
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were felt most strongly. Inevitably, the Evangelicals suffered the most
because of their insistence on the linkage between religion and German
language and culture. A few congregations simply suspended all public
functions for several months. Others tried to make the requisite transition to Portuguese. Some that were located in remote rural districts
ignored the wartime restrictions entirely and continued undisturbed.
Enforcement was thus inconsistent or haphazard. Higher government
officials often tended to be tolerant and understanding, but local
authorities were sometimes harsh and unyielding. Still other officials
enforced the anti-German decrees only when superpatriots in a local
community demanded it. Individual preachers and parishes endured
harassment, but the most important general consequence of the war for
the Evangelicals was that it cut off the source of financial support and
the supply of well-trained clergymen. They were thus forced to become
more independent, more self-reliant. 33
In contrast to the Evangelicals, the Catholics and the Missouri Synod
Lutherans fared reasonably well. Again, individual clergymen and
congregations suffered, sometimes deservedly. The Lutherans, because
of their connections with the United States, actually prospered during
the war, and, by all accounts, suffered no depredations during the riots,
even though their congregations included virtually no one who was not
German. In the numerically dominant Catholic church, the ranking
Brazilian prelate (the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro), issued a pastoral
letter urging understanding and tolerance of the Teuto-Brazilians, but
the German-born archbishop of Porto Alegre, Joao Becker, imposed his
own prohibition against the use of the German language in his diocese,
closed all Catholic schools administered by German priests, and replaced parish priests of German birth. When individual German parishes were attacked in the superpatriotic press, Becker failed to defend
them, fearing the wrath of superpatriots within Brazil's ruling class, and
earning thereby the contempt of many Teuto-Brazilian Catholics. 34
It was relatively easy for the numerous Vereine to accommodate to the
new restrictions, compared to the churches, schools, and newspapers.
Large numbers changed their names to something in Portuguese; some
revised and rewrote their governing documents and opened their doors
to persons other than Germans. Even so, most such organizations lost
many members during the war and some simply voted themselves out
of existence. 35
Brazil's actual participation in the war was limited. Its navy patrolled
a part of the Atlantic but no soldiers were sent to the battlefields of
Europe. Agricultural production was greatly stimulated, but the impact
of war was almost imperceptible for most persons. Under such conditions, the intense anti-German feelings that prevailed during the fall
months of 1917 were bound to dissipate. Some of the severest federal
restrictions were relaxed and a few were removed by spring, 1918,
although the ban on publication in the German language remained in
force through most of 1919. On the state level there was much variation.
In Santa Catarina, for example, restrictions against German-language
schools remained in force until 1921. 36
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After the war, the Germans of Brazil quickly returned to their old
patterns of cultural chauvinism and self-imposed separation. Germanlanguage schools reopened, newspapers resumed publication, German
sermons were heard again in the churches, and the Vereine resumed
their activities as before the war. Teuto-Brazilian businessmen and
industrialists prospered. Nevertheless, the forces of assimilation inevitably eroded ethnic consciousness in many persons. It is impossible to
determine how many Teuto-Brazilians were absorbed into the Brazilian
mainstream because of war-born influences. But in the isolated, rural
colonies, bastions of German ethnicity remained intact, if not untouched. The cultural distance between Teuto-Brazilians and the rest of
society, enhanced by the strong sense of German cultural superiority,
remained much greater in Brazil than in the United States, where the
decline of German ethnicity was almost precipitous. 37
Even though a general spirit of tolerance prevailed in Brazil in the
postwar decade, a residue of bitterness remained. Just as some LusoBrazilian patriots continued to insist that national unity demanded
programs of forced assimilation, there were Teuto-Brazilians who felt
more disillusioned and more alienated from political life than ever
before. 38 Some newspapers, such as the Germania of Sao Paulo, resumed preaching the gospel of ethnic chauvinism immediately upon
resumption of publication in 1919. Still, this journal also insisted that
Germans owed their Brazilian fatherland love and loyalty and that they
had the responsibility to work for its progress and welfare. 39 Nevertheless, the sense of resentment remained keen in many Teuto-Brazilian
hearts. Their sense of ethnic distinctiveness had been intensified by the
war; it was further strengthened by political unrest in the southern
states of Brazil during the 1920s, when self-protection against revolutionary bands became necessary in some communities. Taken together,
these experiences caused many German Brazilians to be receptive to the
siren song of Volkspolitik. When the Nazi variations on that theme were
played in the 1930s, some Teuto-Brazilians found the music irresistible. 40 Given this history, it should come as no surprise that the
programs of forced assimilation undertaken by the Brazilian government under the Vargas regime and thereafter were more intense and
prolonged than anything attempted during World War I.
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